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Toxic TORTS AND MASS TORTS
Brent M. Rosenthal*
ASES involving personal injuries and property damage caused by
chemicals or other toxic substances pose unique and challenging
issues to the courts. Because toxic exposures generally act insidi-
ously and over time, these types of cases often present issues relating to
latency and causation. Moreover, chemical releases and toxic exposures
frequently generate hundreds or even thousands of claims; the sheer
number of claims presents its own unique challenge to the administration
of justice. Since the mid-1990's, the Texas Supreme Court has expressly
acknowledged and addressed the special problems confronted by Texas
courts in toxic tort' and mass tort2 litigation.
Although the Texas Legislature did not enact any laws specifically af-
fecting toxic or mass tort cases during the Survey period, Texas state and
federal courts have addressed a variety of substantive and case manage-
ment issues in these types of cases. The courts have examined the scope
of the duties owed to claimants by product suppliers and employers, de-
cided whether multiple causes of action may accrue for successive latent
injuries caused by the same toxic exposure, and considered the type of
expert testimony required to prove causation in a toxic tort case. The
courts have also continued the trend of limiting the availability of the
class action device to resolve mass tort litigation, widened the scope of
discovery available to defendants in mass tort cases, and recognized the
practical importance of the choice between a state and a federal forum in
toxic injury litigation. Because of the size and scope of these cases, one
can expect them to continue to receive special judicial consideration for
years to come.
I. SUBSTANTIVE AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. DUTY AND DEFENSES
In Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez,3 the Texarkana Court of
* Shareholder, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, Texas, and Lecturer in Law on Mass
Tort Litigation, Southern Methodist University School of Law. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of Carla Burke, Misty Farris, and Amy Shahan-all of whom are
lawyers in the firm of Baron & Budd, P.C.-in preparing this survey.
1. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997)
(recognizing the "difficult issues surrounding proof of causation in a toxic tort case").
2. See, e.g., In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tex. 1998) ("The mass tort litiga-
tion that has proliferated over the last two decades has caused departures from traditional
ways in which cases have been filed, discovery has proceeded, and trials have been
set.");CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (noting "problems inherent in
many, if not all, mass tort cases").
3. 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed).
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Appeals considered whether the "sophisticated user defense" relieved a
supplier of silica products of its duty to warn end users of the products'
dangerous propensities. The court's rejection of the sophisticated user
defense in Gomez gives plaintiffs in toxic tort cases new ammunition to
defeat this defense, although Humble Sand's petition for review is pend-
ing before the Texas Supreme Court.4
Raymond Gomez developed subacute silicosis as a result of his expo-
sure to silica products while working for Spincote. 5 He sued the supplier
of the products, Humble Sand, for failing to warn of the dangers of the
products and obtained a judgment for his damages. 6 On appeal, Humble
Sand argued that it did not have a duty to warn Gomez of the dangers of
exposure to silica products because Spincote was a sophisticated user.7
The Texarkana Court of Appeals, in a majority opinion by Justice Ross,
reiterated the general rule that a manufacturer or supplier has a nondele-
gable duty to warn ultimate users or consumers of the dangers of its prod-
uct. 8 The court acknowledged that in exceptional cases, "a manufacturer
or supplier may depend on an intermediary to communicate a warning to
the ultimate user of a product." 9 However, the court noted, "[flor the
sophisticated user exception to apply, the intermediary must have knowl-
edge or sophistication equal to that of the manufacturer or supplier, and
the manufacturer must be able to reasonably rely on the intermediary to
warn the ultimate consumer."' 0 The court added that under the version
of the defense that appears in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 388 (1965), reliance on even a knowledgeable intermediary may be un-
reasonable if the magnitude of the risk is great and it would not be un-
duly burdensome to warn the user directly.'" The court found that
Humble Sand produced no evidence that it ascertained the knowledge
possessed by Spincote and verified Spincote's safety procedures, or that
Spincote held itself out as an expert on the subject of silicosis.' 2 Because
Humble Sand had failed to demonstrate that Spincote possessed full
knowledge of the possible harm and necessary precautions involved in
the use of Humble Sand's product, the court concluded, "Humble Sand
has not met the threshold to assert the sophisticated user defense.' 13
Chief Justice Cornelius dissented, arguing that the law did not obligate
Humble Sand to show that it investigated the knowledge or actual prac-





8. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d at 494.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 495.
11. Id. at 497-98 (quoting extensively from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388
cmt. n (1965)).
12. Id. at 499.
13. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d at 501.
14. Id. at 510-11 (Cornelius, C.J., dissenting).
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During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit considered two cases in-
volving injuries caused by the use of tobacco products. In both Davis v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Inc.15 and Harris v. Philip Morris Inc.,16 the plain-
tiffs sought to impose liability on tobacco companies for their injuries
under a theory of civil assault. The plaintiffs asserted this theory in an
attempt to circumvent a provision in the Texas Product Liability Act that
expressly bars a product liability action if the product is inherently unsafe
and is a common consumer product intended for personal consumption,
"such as ... tobacco. 1 7 The plaintiffs argued that their claims were not
product liability claims but were claims alleging an intentional tort. The
Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs' civil assault claims, like the fraud,
conspiracy, and deceptive trade practices claims that had been alleged
and dismissed in a previous case,18 were actually "product liability
claims," because they were based on the defendants' wrongful conduct in
failing to warn the plaintiffs of the dangers of the products. 19 Despite the
plaintiffs' "legal labels and conclusory characterizations,"20 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held in each case that the plaintiffs' civil assault claims were barred
by the Texas Product Liability Act.21
B. LIMITATIONS AND ACCRUAL
In PusteJovsky v. Rapid-American Corp.,22 the Texas Supreme Court
considered whether more than one cause of action can accrue from the
same toxic exposure. Henry Pustejovsky had been occupationally ex-
posed to asbestos from 1954 through 1979, and in 1982 was diagnosed
with asbestosis, a nonmalignant scarring of the lung.23 He filed suit
against Johns-Manville Corporation, one of the suppliers of asbestos
products to his employer, and received a small settlement.2 4 In 1994, Pus-
tejovsky was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a fatal cancer of the lining of
the lung, caused by his occupational exposure to asbestos.2 5 He sued
other suppliers of asbestos for damages caused by his mesothelioma.26
The defendants in the second suit argued that his cause of action accrued
in 1982 when he first discovered harm caused by exposure to asbestos
and, therefore, that his mesothelioma claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. 27 In response, Pustejovsky presented undisputed medical evi-
dence that asbestosis and mesothelioma are separate injuries resulting
15. 231 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 2000).
16. 232 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2000).
17. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.004(2) (Vernon 1997).
18. Harris, 232 F.3d at 459 (citing Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491
(5th Cir. 1999)).
19. Id. at 459; Davis, 231 F.3d at 930.
20. Harris, 232 F.3d at 459.
21. Id.; Davis, 231 F.3d at 930.
22. 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000).
23. Id. at 644-45.
24. Id. at 645.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 645.
2002] 1377
SMU LAW REVIEW
from separate disease processes.28 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment based on the statute of limitations, 29 and the San Antonio Court of
Appeals affirmed holding that Pustejovsky had one cause of action based
on his asbestos exposure which accrued in 1982 when he first discovered
harm.30
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pustejovsky's later
claim for asbestos-related cancer did not accrue until the cancer was rea-
sonably discoverable. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Gonza-
les, the court recognized the general rule that only one cause of action
accrues from a defendant's single breach of a legal duty.3' The court
found, though, that restricting a plaintiff who suffers successive latent in-
juries from a toxic occupational exposure to a single cause of action
would be inefficient as well as unjust. 32 Application of the single action
rule in this context would virtually compel workers-even those other-
wise disinclined to sue-to assert claims at the earliest appearance of
some harm and then attempt to recover for all possible future conditions,
including those separate and dissimilar from the current injury.33 Such
"premature litigation of speculative claims" should be discouraged, the
court said.34 Defendants' interest in repose, the court added, was out-
weighed, not only by "the plaintiff's need of an opportunity to seek re-
dress for the gravest injuries," 35 but also by the efficiencies and other
benefits of adjudicating claims of existing injury rather than anticipated,
speculative future injury.36
The court did not want to craft a broad rule for application in litigation
with which it was unfamiliar, so it expressly limited its holding in Pus-
tejovsky to "asbestos-related diseases resulting from workplace expo-
sure."'37 The court noted that asbestos litigation is a "mature tort" in
which "the relevant medical science is advanced."'38 But the reasoning of
Pustejovsky may have equal force in cases involving other types of toxic
substances. Consequently, the applicability of the Pustejovsky rule in
other factual contexts will have to be established on a case-by-case basis.
In Nugent v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp.,39 the Texarkana Court of Appeals
applied the discovery rule in a case involving cancer allegedly caused by
the defendant's negligent dumping activities. Beginning in 1991, the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Pustejovsky v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 980 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1998), rev'd sub nom. Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex.
2000).
31. Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 646-47.
32. Id. at 652-53.
33. Id. at 653.
34. Id. (citing Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Tex. 1998)) (internal citation
omitted).
35. Id.
36. Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 646-47.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 654.
39. 30 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
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plaintiffs learned that noxious and toxic chemicals and chicken waste
dumped by Pilgrim's Pride on its property was raising the toxicity of the
soil on their adjoining farm.40 In 1994 one of the plaintiffs was diagnosed
with skin cancer, and the other plaintiff was diagnosed with neurological
injuries and an elevated risk of cancer.41 The plaintiffs filed suit on Au-
gust 30, 1994.42 Pilgrim's Pride argued that the plaintiffs' personal injury
claims were barred, because they were filed more than two years after the
plaintiffs discovered that their farm had been contaminated. 43 The plain-
tiffs countered that the discovery rule applied to toll the limitations pe-
riod until they knew or should have known that their injuries were caused
by the defendants' wrongdoing.44 The Texarkana Court of Appeals rec-
ognized that the discovery rule, enunciated by the Texas Supreme Court
in Childs v. Haussecker,45 normally applied to latent occupational dis-
eases. 46 Although the plaintiffs did not have an occupational disease the
court held that the discovery rule applied to the plaintiffs' claims, and
therefore the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 1994 when
they discovered they had diseases related to the defendant's wrongful
conduct. 47
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Since the Texas Supreme Court mandated in E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Robinson48 and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner49
that the trial court serve as a "gatekeeper" over the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, Texas courts have struggled to define the "gatekeeper"
role. The Robinson/Havner analysis of expert testimony concerning cau-
sation has become a significant hurdle for plaintiffs in toxic tort cases,
especially in the area of new or emerging toxic torts.
In Martinez v. City of San Antonio,50 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals upheld summary judgment based on "no evidence" of causation af-
ter the trial court struck the testimony of two plaintiffs' experts. The
plaintiffs alleged personal injuries and property damage from exposure to
lead released into their neighborhood during construction of the
Alamodome on the site of an old iron foundry. The plaintiffs offered
testimony by Dr. Jack Matson to establish exposure levels attributable to
releases from the construction site.51 Dr. Matson used an accepted EPA
test to calculate the amount of "fugitive dust" released during the con-
40. Id. at 565-566.
41. Id. at 571.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Nugent, 30 S.W.3d at 571.
45. 974 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Tex. 1998).
46. Nugent, 30 S.W.3d at 572.
47. Id. at 574.
48. 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995).
49. 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997)
50. 40 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
51. Id. at 590.
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struction activities. 52 Next, Dr. Matson calculated the level of lead in the
"fugitive dust."'53 Although soil samples demonstrated the percentage of
lead in the soil at the site, Dr. Matson concluded that these samples did
not accurately reflect the lead levels in the lighter, airborne "fugitive
dust" from the site.54 He applied an "enrichment factor" of 3.3 to re-
present the percentage of lead in the "fugitive dust." In other words, he
opined that the lead level in dust released from the site was 3.3 times
higher than the level of lead found in soil samples at the construction site
itself.55 Moreover, Dr. Matson supported application of his "enrichment
factor" by reference to a study of releases from a lead smelter in a New
Mexico desert. But the trial court found that the New Mexico study
showed inadequate similarities with the San Antonio site to be a reliable
foundation for Dr. Matson's use of the "enrichment factor. '56 The trial
court struck the affidavit of Dr. Matson and that of another expert, Dr.
Colin J. Baynes, who relied on Dr. Matson's conclusions in rendering an
opinion regarding the amount of lead emitted through the construction
activities.57 The court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of these affida-
vits, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
testimony unreliable. 58
Even if the testimony of these experts had not been excluded, the court
of appeals determined that summary judgment would still have been
proper, because the plaintiffs' evidence constituted "no evidence" of cau-
sation.59 The plaintiffs offered proof of elevated lead levels at the
Alamodome site, and proof that the children had been exposed to lead
and suffered injuries consistent with that exposure, but the plaintiffs
could not prove that the Alamodome was the source of the lead.60 Dr.
Matson's testimony was offered to prove the source of the lead. How-
ever, his testimony was "no evidence" that the lead came from the
Alamodome site because Dr. Matson "failed to rule out alternative
sources of lead contamination. '61 Consequently, the Martinez plaintiffs
failed to carry their summary judgment burden on causation, because
they could not prove that the lead in their neighborhood came from the
lead at the construction site.
In Hess v. McLean Feedyard, Inc.,62 the Amarillo Court of Appeals
considered similar issues in a property damage case. The plaintiffs al-
leged that runoff from the defendant's feedyard operations contaminated
their surface and ground water. In opposing summary judgment, the
52. Id. at 593.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Martinez, 40 S.W.3d at 593.
56. Id,
57. Id. at 590.
58. Id. at 594.
59. Id. at 595.
60. Martinez, 40 S.W.3d at 595.
61. Id.
62. 59 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied).
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plaintiffs offered the affidavit of Dr. Baxley, which consisted of sixteen
single-spaced pages in which he outlined his credentials, described his ex-
perience in similar cases, and discredited the reports of the Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission on the alleged groundwater con-
tamination.63 The affidavit, however, did not include a recitation of the
facts upon which Dr. Baxley based his causation opinions. Because the
affidavit relied on assumptions that had not been proven as fact, the court
of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking
the affidavit. 64
Like the Martinez court, the Hess court found that, even if admitted,
the affidavit provided "no evidence" of causation. The relevant portions
of the affidavit were conclusory and thus failed to raise an issue of fact. 65
Moreover, like the expert in Martinez, Dr. Baxley failed to rule out alter-
native causes of the plaintiffs' damages.66 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
provided no evidence, through expert affidavits or otherwise, of the water
quality prior to runoff from the feedyards. Without this evidence, the
plaintiffs could not raise a fact issue on causation.67
But in Jarrell v. Park Cities Carpet & Upholstery Cleaning, Inc. ,68 the
Dallas Court of Appeals limited the trial court's discretion in excluding
expert testimony. The plaintiff in Jarrell became ill after she was exposed
to two chemical products used to remove smoke odor from the carpets at
the office where she worked. 69 Although no epidemiological studies of
these products had been done, the plaintiff offered epidemiological stud-
ies of the chemical components of the products at issue.70 The defendant
asserted that only epidemiological studies of the specific products at is-
sue-not studies of the components of the products-were admissible. 71
The trial court agreed with the defendant, excluded the plaintiff's evi-
dence of causation, and granted a directed verdict for the defendant. 72
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, noting that "[a] manufacturer
could make slight variations in chemical solutions, apply different trade
names, and then assert there was no study of the variant solution. Such
an application reduces the RobinsonlHavner analysis to a matter of se-
mantics, not science. '73
63. Id. at 685-86.
64. Id. at 686-87.
65. Id. at 686.
66. Id. at 687.
67. Hess, 59 S.W.3d at 688.
68. 53 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. filed).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 902.
71. Id. at 903.
72. Id.
73. Jarrell, 53 S.W.3d at 903.
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II. CASE MANAGEMENT ISSUES
A. CLASS ACTIONS
During the Survey period, Texas courts imposed additional require-
ments on parties seeking class certification and heeded the Texas Su-
preme Court's admonition in Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal that
"the class action will rarely be an appropriate device for resolving" per-
sonal injury claims.74 In McAllen Medical Center, Inc. v. Cortez,75 the
Texas Supreme Court again eschewed the "certify now, worry later" ap-
proach rejected in Bernaf 6 and required the same rigorous pre-certifica-
tion analysis described in Bernal of a "settlement-only class."'77 The
plaintiff in McAllen brought a putative class action against Dr. Francisco
Bracamontes and McAllen Medical Center ("MMC"), the hospital where
he practiced, claiming that they had misrepresented the qualifications of
the hospital's cardiac surgeons. 78 The plaintiff sought damages for eco-
nomic loss, mental anguish, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 79 After the plaintiff settled with the doctor, the trial court certified
a settlement class consisting of every patient who had undergone cardiac
surgery at the hospital during a five and a half year period. 80 The certifi-
cation order preliminarily approved the settlement but delayed review of
the certification criteria under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42.81 The
hospital tried to appeal the certification, but the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the challenge to the certifica-
tion and settlement was premature and that the hospital lacked standing
to appeal the order. 82
On review, the Texas Supreme Court cautioned that because a prelimi-
nary certification has an "immediate, significant, and perhaps irrepara-
ble" effect on the course of the proceedings, such an order cannot evade
appellate review even if it is termed "preliminary," and the trial court will
reconsider its ruling later at the fairness hearing.83 Because the trial
court had certified the class without first requiring proof that the pro-
posed class met the certification requirements, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the order was ripe for appeal. 84 The supreme court also re-
jected the appellate court's decision that, as a nonsettling defendant, the
hospital had no standing to complain about the settlement class. In addi-
tion, the supreme court also held that "a nonsettling defendant has stand-
ing to contest certification of a settlement class if the nonsettling
74. 22 S.W.3d 425, 436 (Tex. 2000).
75. 66 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2001).
76. 22 S.W.3d at 435.
77. McAllen, 66 S.W.3d at 232.
78. Id. at 230.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 230-31.
81. Id. at 231.
82. McAllen, 66 S.W.3d at 231.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Id. at 233.
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defendant can show that the certification adversely affects it.''85 The
court noted that the proposed class notice itself adversely affected the
hospital "by allowing class counsel to assert MMC's complicity to the
broadly defined class and solicit claims against MMC, while at the same
time denying MMC the opportunity to object because the order purport-
edly relates only to a settlement with Bracamontes. '' 86 Having resolved
that the order was ripe for appeal and that the hospital had standing to
challenge the order, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the case to the
court of appeals for consideration of the merits of the appeal.
87
Likewise, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals followed the Texas Su-
preme Court's conservative approach to class actions by reversing class
certification in Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Usrey.88 The proposed class in
Usrey consisted of health care workers who had sustained needlesticks
from used needles.89 The plaintiffs asserted products liability claims
against the suppliers of the needles, alleging that all conventional syringes
and blood collection devices were defectively designed and that available
alternative designs would have prevented needlesticks. 90 The trial court
certified a class of workers seeking only economic damages for the rea-
sonable costs of various tests the workers requested after their needles-
ticks. 91 The appellate court explained that suits involving allegedly
defective medical devices may be the weakest candidates for certification
under Bernal's "rigorous analysis" of the predominance of common is-
sues of law or fact over questions affecting only individual class mem-
bers.92 Because the evidence showed that the class members' needlestick
injuries occurred in a variety of circumstances, the appellate court con-
cluded that issues of causation and comparative responsibility would be
distinct for each class member and reversed the trial court's
certification.93
In Texas Department of Transportation v. Barrier,94 the Houston Four-
teenth District Court of Appeals reversed class certification in a property
damage case, because the record did not show that common issues would
predominate over individual issues, or that litigation of individual claims
would create a risk of inconsistent results. The class action was brought
against the Texas Department of Transportation and the Harris County
Flood Control District by property owners alleging that the manner in
which the defendants constructed a beltway and its drainage system
caused more severe flooding to their properties than would otherwise
85. Id. at 235.
86. Id. at 236.
87. McAllen, 66 S.W.3d at 238.
88. 57 S.W.3d 488, 498 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet. h.).
89. Id. at 489.
90. Id. at 490.
91. Id. at 490-491.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Usrey, 57 S.W.3d at 495.
94. 40 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
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have occurred during a flood. 95 The plaintiffs sought certification only of
common issues regarding liability and planned to litigate separately the
causation and damages issues peculiar to each plaintiff. Moreover, the
trial court's order certified the class "as to liability issues only" without
specifying which issues would be submitted to the jury in the class action
phase and which would be decided in the individual phases. 96 The appel-
late court noted that since the elevated flood levels were claimed to have
been caused by multiple defendants doing different things at different
locations, a finding that the defendants were responsible for elevated
flooding in one area would not establish whether any one defendant or all
defendants were responsible for higher levels in another area.97 Under
these circumstances, the evidence did not demonstrate that issues com-
mon to the certified class would be the object of most of the efforts of the
litigants, because each class member would have to prove which defen-
dant caused the flooding on his particular property.98 As a result, the
appellate court reversed the certification and remanded to the trial court
for proceedings consistent with the Bernal opinion, which was not avail-
able at the time the trial court granted certification. 99
The trend against class certification of mass tort cases was reflected in
federal as well as state courts during the Survey period. In Neely v.
Ethicon, Inc.,100 the plaintiffs sought certification in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas of a class consisting of
individuals injured by contaminated Vicryl surgical sutures implanted in
their bodies during medical procedures. 0 1 In an attempt to satisfy the
federal certification requirements, the plaintiffs sought class certification
only for determination of common issues regarding liability and planned
to litigate separately each class member's causation and damages. 10 2 De-
spite the proposed bifurcation of common and individual issues, the dis-
trict court explained that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b),
common questions must predominate over any questions affecting only
individual class members, even if the common and individual issues will
be decided in different proceedings. 10 3 Further, because the proposed
nationwide class involved class members from many states, the court ex-
plained that the variations in those jurisdictions' substantive law pre-
cluded a single determination of what appeared to be the common
"breach of duty" issue.104 The court concluded that "there are too many
individual issues in Plaintiffs' proposed class that defeat predominance
and superiority, even though there is a common nucleus of facts concern-
95. Id. at 155.
96. Id. at 157.
97. Id. at 159.
98. Id.
99. Barrier, 40 S.W.3d at 160.
100. No. 1:00-CV-00569, 2001 WL 1090204 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2001).
101. Id. at *1.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *5.
104. Id. at *7-8.
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ing Defendants' conducts. 10 5 Thus, the court denied certification.
B. DISCOVERY IN MASS AND Toxic TORT CASES
During and beyond the Survey period, the Texas courts continued to
grapple with the issue of the extent to which a trial court presiding over a
mass tort case can restrict discovery to the claims of a small group of
plaintiffs selected for trial by the plaintiffs' counsel. In In re Van Waters
& Rogers,10 6 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that the trial court
could properly restrict discovery to the claims of plaintiffs set for trial, but
the Texas Supreme Court held that the restrictions were impermissible.
Van Waters & Rogers involved a case brought by over 400 workers who
alleged that they had sustained various injuries as a result of exposure to
a "toxic soup" created by the use of chemicals at the Parker-Hannifin
Corporation processing plant in McAllen, Texas. 10 7 They sued more than
50 manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors of chemical products to the
plant.' 08 The defendants propounded the usual interrogatory seeking evi-
dentiary support for the plaintiffs' allegation regarding causation of injury
to all plaintiffs. 10 9 The plaintiffs uniformly responded that they did not
recall.110 The trial court then restricted discovery to a group of 20 plain-
tiffs selected for trial by plaintiffs' counsel.11 The defendants sought
mandamus relief from the trial court's order restricting discovery. In
1998, the Texas Supreme Court denied relief "without prejudice" to en-
able the trial court to reconsider its order in light of the Court's interven-
ing decision in In re Colonial Pipeline,12 in which the court held that a
similar abatement of discovery was a clear abuse of discretion." 3 After
the supreme court issued its order, the trial court changed the group of
plaintiffs whose cases would be tried, but it declined to order the plain-
tiffs to provide a substantive answer to the causation interrogatory and
refused to allow discovery regarding the claims of the plaintiffs whose
claims were not set for trial.' 14 On a petition for mandamus filed by the
defendants, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals ordered the trial court
to require the plaintiffs to answer the causation interrogatory but de-
clined to order the trial court to permit discovery regarding the non-trial
plaintiffs.'1 5 The appellate court did "not believe the supreme court's de-
cision in Colonial Pipeline intended to prohibit trial courts from selecting
small groups of trial plaintiffs to serve as test cases while abating discov-
105. Neely, 2001 WL 1090294, at *15.
106. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000),
mandamus conditionally granted, 62 S.W.3d 197, 2001 (Tex. 2001).




111. Id. at 199.
112. 968 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. 1998).
113. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 199.
114. Id. at 199-200.
115. Id. at 200.
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ery as to the remaining plaintiffs in order to manage mass tort cases.' 16
However, the supreme court promptly granted mandamus to order the
trial court to permit the requested discovery. The court acknowledged
that "a trial court must be given latitude in managing discovery and pre-
paring a case for trial, especially a case as complex as this," but noted that
such latitude is not unlimited. 117 It observed that a "blanket abatement
of discovery cannot be justified by the goal of an orderly trial process
when not one plaintiff has yet gone to trial." 118 The supreme court added
that the trial court's restriction on discovery prevented it from selecting
an appropriate group of cases to try.119 The supreme court also noted
that its decisions in In re Ethyl Corp. °20 and In re Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co.1' 1 established the factors to be considered in determining whether
cases should be consolidated for trial. The trial court's refusal to permit
discovery regarding the whole group of cases made it impossible to deter-
mine whether the factors permitting consolidation were satisfied.' 22 Con-
sequently, the Texas Supreme Court directed the trial court to permit
discovery concerning all plaintiffs' claims without delay, and then deter-
mine how the claims will be tried in compliance with Ethyl and Bristol-
Myers.'2 3
In In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc.,124 the Tyler Court of Appeals
granted mandamus to permit a defendant in an asbestos case to withdraw
admissions of liability deemed for failure to respond. The plaintiff had
sued Brown & Root, alleging that its negligent construction work ex-
posed the decedent to asbestos dust, thus causing him to develop
mesothelioma.12 5 The plaintiff served discovery, including requests for
admissions, on counsel for Brown & Root. 2 6 Brown & Root failed to
respond within the time provided by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the requests were therefore deemed admitted by operation of law.' 2 7
After the plaintiff's attorney brought the failure to the attention of
Brown & Root's counsel, Brown & Root delivered responses to plaintiff's
counsel four days later.'2 8 Brown & Root's attorney stated in an affidavit
that the failure to respond to the requests for admission was the result of
accident or mistake and was not intentional or the result of conscious
indifference. As a result, Brown & Root moved to strike, withdraw, or
amend the deemed admissions. 12 9 After the trial court denied Brown &
116. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 31 S.W.3d at 418.
117. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 200..
118. Id.
119. Id. at 201.
120. 975 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1998).
121. 975 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1998).
122. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 201.
123. Id.
124. 45 S.W.3d 772, 777 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.).
125. Id. at 773.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 774; TEX. R. Ov. P. 198.2(c)
128. Brown & Root, 45 S.W.3d at 774.
129. Id.
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Root's motion, the defendant filed a petition for writ of mandamus.130
The Tyler appellate court concluded that Brown & Root demonstrated
good cause for withdrawal or amendment of its deemed admissions, be-
cause its failure to respond to the requests was unintentional and the
plaintiff was not prejudiced by receiving the responses eight weeks before
trial.131 The court further noted that the trial court's refusal to allow
Brown & Root to strike, withdraw, or amend the deemed admissions
eliminated the defendant's ability to present any viable defense at trial
and acted as a "death penalty sanction. 1 32 Because the presentation of
the merits of the case would be served by allowing Brown & Root to
present defenses, the appellate court ordered the trial court to allow the
defendant to amend its deemed admissions.1
33
C. REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Under principles of federalism long recognized by the United States
Supreme Court, the ultimate outcome of a diversity case should be sub-
stantially the same whether the case proceeds in state court or federal
court.1 34 In many toxic tort and mass tort cases, however, the presence of
the case in state court or federal court can, as a practical matter, deter-
mine the outcome of the litigation. For example, prior to 1993, state
courts in Texas were forbidden by statute from dismissing cases under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens; 135 however, federal courts were free to
apply the federal rule allowing dismissal based on this doctrine.1 36 In ad-
dition, cases involving non-malignant asbestos-related injury are legally
viable in state courts, 137 but in federal courts, such cases are transferred
to a pending MDL proceeding, where pursuant to procedures established
130. Id.
131. Id. at 776.
132. Id. at 777.
133. Brown & Root, 45 S.W.3d at 777.
134. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1996) (citing
Guar. Trust and Hanna); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stating that
"where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried
in a [s]tate court"); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (explaining that the Guar-
anty Trust principle must not be applied mechanically but instead must be guided by the
"twin aims" of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938): "discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws").
135. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (1990) (construing TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 71.031 (Vernon 1986)).
136. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir.1987)
(en banc) ("[A] federal court sitting in a diversity action is required to apply the federal
law of forum non conveniens when addressing motions to dismiss a plaintiff's case to a
foreign forum"), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989), prior opinion reinstated in relevant part, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.
1989).
137. See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-




by the presiding district judge, such cases are deferred indefinitely.138
Consequently, in mass and toxic tort cases, issues concerning the propri-
ety of removal to federal court and the availability of remand to state
court frequently have overriding significance.
In Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 1 3 9 several thousand plaintiffs exposed to
pesticides on foreign banana farms sued the United States companies that
manufactured the pesticides. 140 The plaintiffs filed in Texas state court;
the defendants removed the cases to federal court. 141 The Fifth Circuit
characterized the parties' choices of state or federal court as a battle over
whether forum non conveniens would be available to "send these suits
back to their countries of origin."'1 42 To get into federal court, the de-
fendants impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Company, Limited ("Dead Sea")
as a third party defendant with a "foreign state" status.143 Dead Sea re-
moved the cases to federal court and waived its sovereign immunity. 144
The plaintiffs first challenged the federal court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion, claiming that Dead Sea was not a foreign state under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a) 145 because a majority of its shares are not owned by a foreign
state. 146 The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that this "indi-
rect" ownership did not satisfy the statute, and therefore found that the
federal district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over any case
properly removed by Dead Sea. 147
The plaintiffs also challenged the validity of the removals, because, at
the time Dead Sea removed the cases, the state court had not granted
leave for the defendants to serve their third-party petitions against Dead
Sea, even though the state court later granted leave to serve the peti-
tions. 148 The Fifth Circuit also rejected this argument, finding that the
removals were neither premature nor invalid for lack of leave to serve
because the law does not require service as a prerequisite to removal. 1 49
The court pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), 150 which suggests that the re-
moving defendant may receive notice by means other than service, and 28
U.S.C. § 1448,151 which provides for service in the federal court after
138. See 11 No. 17 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORT: ASBESTOS 3 (1996) (quoting law-
yers describing MDL as a "black hole" and arguing that the MDL judge "has effectively
shut down the federal court system to plaintiffs who are not 'totally disabled' by asbestos
exposure.").
139. 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001).
140. Id.
141. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 169.
142. Id. at 169. At the time the cases were filed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
was available in federal court but not in Texas state court.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2002).
146. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 175. The state of Israel owns 75.3% of Israel Chemicals Lim-
ited, which owns 88.2% of Dead Sea Works, Ltd., which owns 100% of Dead Sea.
147. Id. at 175-76.
148. Id. at 176.
149. Id. at 177.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2002).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (2002).
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removal. 152
The plaintiffs also challenged the joinder of Dead Sea as a fraudulent
or collusive attempt to create federal jurisdiction.153 The plaintiffs noted
that the defendants had entered into formal agreements capping Dead
Sea's ultimate liability, indicating that the joinder of Dead Sea was
merely a ruse to allow removal to federal court.1 54 The plaintiffs also
pointed out that they had disclaimed any recovery from Dead Sea in their
amended petitions, cutting off the defendant's right to contribution under
Texas law and eliminating any practical reason-such as the need to pro-
tect the foreign defendant from provincial state courts-for exercising
federal jurisdiction. 155 The Fifth Circuit was reluctant to expand the judi-
cial doctrine of fraudulent joinder beyond the usual circumstances in
which the plaintiff joins a third party in order to defeat diversity, espe-
cially when application of the doctrine might conflict with Congress's
plan that foreign sovereigns have access to the federal courts.' 56 How-
ever, the court did not decide whether the doctrine might apply since it
concluded that, even if it did apply, the plaintiffs were unable to prove
that Dead Sea was fraudulently joined. 57 The court held that the agree-
ments between Dead Sea and the other defendants capping Dead Sea's
liability were made too long after the removals to support the conclusion
that the joinder was collusive. 158 Moreover, the court rejected the plain-
tiffs' contention that the defendants' third-party claims against Dead Sea
could not be maintained due to the plaintiffs' disclaimer of liability, hold-
ing that Texas law did not apply to this issue. 159 Because the plaintiffs
had not pled and proved their fraudulent joinder claim under any applic-
able law, the court held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden. 16°
The Fifth Circuit's ruling effectively approved the removal of these cases.
Consequently, the defendants were successful in their forum choice and
parlayed that win into the sought-after forum non conveniens dismissal.
Conversely, in Sbrusch v. Dow Chemical Co., 1 6 1 the plaintiff was able
to regain her chosen state forum. The Sbrusch defendant removed on the
basis of diversity. 162 The plaintiff argued that the case was not remov-
able, because the decedent's work-related death from benzene exposure
arose under Texas workmen's compensation laws. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1445(c), 16 3 "[a] civil action in any [s]tate court arising under the work-
men's compensation laws of such [s]tate may not be removed to any dis-
152. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 177.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 179.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 178.
157. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 178-79.
158. Id. at 179.
159. Id. at 179-81.
160. Id. at 181.
161. 124 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
162. Id. at 1091.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (2002).
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trict court in the United States.' 64 The plaintiff brought suit under Texas
Labor Code section 408.001(b), 165 alleging that her husband's benzene-
related death "was caused by an intentional act or omission of the em-
ployer or by the employer's gross negligence.' 1 66 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded, based on its reading of Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc.,167 that
the Texas Supreme Court would rule that section 408.001(b) "creates an
independent cause of action for exemplary damages based on wrongful
death. 1 .68 Hence, the court held that the plaintiff's cause of action arose
under Texas workmen's compensation law and was not removable.1 69 As
a result, the plaintiff was able to return to her chosen forum.
As the Delgado opinion makes clear, the courts are often fully aware of
the parties' motives for seeking or avoiding a federal forum. Because
forum choice can have such a powerful impact on the outcome of the
case, it will continue to be a vigorously contested aspect of mass and toxic
tort litigation.
164. Sbrusch, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
165. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.002(b) (Vernon 2002).
166. Sbrusch, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
167. 725 S.W.2d 712, 713 (Tex. 1987).
168. Sbrusch, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
169. Id.
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